Developing a model with a switching mechanism, we show how complex dynamics can be generated even though heterogeneity arises among agents with the same trading rules (fundamentalists). We assume that there are two experts which are imitated by other operators. We show that (i) market instability and periodic, or even, chaotic price fluctuations can be generated; (ii) conditions exist under which an expert can drive another expert out of the market; (iii) two experts can survive when the dynamic system either generates a period doubling bifurcation around an attractor or when an homoclinic bifurcation leads to the merging of the two attractors (i.e. Dieci et al., 2001) ; (iv) a central role is played by the reaction to misalignment of both market makers and agents. JEL: C61, G11, G12, D84
Introduction
In the last decade, starting from empirical works which showed how financial market agents employ different strategies (i.e. Taylor and Allen 1992) , an increasing number of theoretical works have been dedicated to analyzing the dynamics of financial markets due to interactions of heterogeneous agents.
These works specifically try to examine whether certain observable features of financial markets, such as high volatility or unpredictability, can be caused by agents' heterogeneity.
In the canonical models (Day and Huang, 1990; Chiarella, 1992) , the theory of complex dynamics is determined by interactions between traders with different trading rules (for a complete survey see Hommes, 2006) . Three typical investor strategies are usually considered. Fundamentalists look at the distance between current price and a fundamental value which is extracted from information related to the economic system. Chartists work out observed price patterns from the past, trying to take advantage of the bull and bear market. Lastly, there are the noise traders who do not rely on a specific economic thought, but on factors such as rumours (for a complete survey see Hommes, 2006) . Contrary to the efficient market hypothesis, speculators may cause instability in the market. The basic idea is that if averages fail to cancel out differences in beliefs, prices may deviate from the economic fundamentals. Different patterns of instability can be traced by starting from different assumptions. In Day and Huang (1990) and Chiarella (1992) price fluctuations are related to non linearity in the chartists trading rule and a central role is played by the weights assigned to fundamentalists and chartists because while the former has a stabilizing effect, the latter introduces instability to the system. In contrast, in Hommes (1997, 1998) , nonlinearity depends on switching the process from a fundamental to a chartist trading rule and vice versa. The basic idea is that agents moving from one strategy to another in search of better accuracy regarding prediction generate fluctuations that may destabilize the market. Price deviations may be triggered by differences in beliefs and amplified by evolutionary dynamics between different schemes.
Therefore in these models a central role is played by differences in trading rules. Particularly according to Hommes (2006 pag.55) : "Sophisticated traders, such as fundamentalists or rational arbitrageurs typically act as a stabilizing force, pushing prices in the directions of the RE fundamental value. Technical traders, such as feedback traders, trend extrapolators and contrarians typically act as a destabilizing force, pushing prices away from the fundamental".
Developing a model with a switching mechanism, we show how complex dynamics can be generated even though heterogeneity arises among agents with the same trading rule. We assume that there are two experts who act as fundamentalists 1 , and are imitated by other operators. Moreover agents can switch from one expert to the other following an adaptive belief system (Brock and Hommes 1997) . Mainly, agents' switch is driven by experts' ability, approximated by the distance between fundamental value and price. A very simple switch mechanism, based on square error, is employed: the less the margin of square error, the higher the quota of agents that emulate that expert. The switching mechanism has a central role in our story since there is an endogenous relation between the quote of agents that follow each expert and price level. We show that (i) market instability and periodic, or even, chaotic price fluctuations can be generated; (ii) conditions exist under which an expert can drive another expert out of the market;
(iii) two experts can survive when the dynamic system either generates a period doubling bifurcation around an attractor or when an homoclinic bifurcation leads to the merging of the two attractors (i.e. Dieci et al., 2001) ; (iv) a central role is played by the reaction to misalignment of both market makers and agents.
After presenting the model in section two, we will analyse the results when agents are homogeneous in section three.
We will show how the linear map generated guarantees a monotonically or oscillatory convergence for a particular set of parameters. In section four we will discuss the conditions necessary for existence, the stability of fixed points and the insurgence of a flip bifurcation. Widening our analysis, we will show the circumstances, under which an expert is cancelled out by the other, and the appearance of a periodic, or even, chaotic, price fluctuation. Finally section six provides brief concluding remarks ad suggestions for further research.
The Model
As stated above, opposed to a stylized asset pricing model, we have two types of agents: market makers and fundamentalists. The former mediate in transactions, setting prices in reply to excess demand (supply), while the latter, believing that prices move towards their fundamental values, buy assets that are undervalued and sell them when they are overvalued. We assume that there are two experts who act as fundamentalists, and are imitated by other operators.
As in Brock and Hommes (1998) 
where is the strictly positive constant risk aversion for both investors. Hence the investor i demands an amount following:
We assume that they have a common correct expectations on dividends (
) and future prices ( ). It is worth noting that represent the benchmark fundamental values detected by the experts analyzing economic factors, such as macroeconomic indexes (Hommes, 2001) . We are aware that the assumption of common expectations on dividend is restrictive. However, the qualitative dynamic behaviour of the model is not modified but this assumption
. Hence, equation (3) can be rewritten as follows:
where and
is the coefficient reaction of the investors as related to misalignment, and negatively related to risk aversion. For simplicity and to avoid losing generality, we assume .
The price of the asset does not follow a mechanism such as the walrasian auctioneer but a market maker mechanism where out of equilibrium exchanges are possible. Particularly, market makers apply the following rule:
The function points out the relation between the excess quantity (demanded or supplied) and the price change where β is the speed of adjustment to change quantity demanded and is the proportion of agents that imitate expert 1 and depend on the switching mechanism. According to (4) with a positive (negative) excess demand market makers dismiss their inventory increasing (decreasing) the price.
2 It is to show that different beliefs alter mainly the halfway steady states, without having any impact on dynamics, because it is unstable and circumscribe just the basins of attractions of coexistent attractors.
The switching process is based on the heterogeneity in expertise, represented by both the distance between the fundamentals and , between the two experts. Particularly, agents are more likely to imitate the expert whose prediction is closer to . Let to be the squared errors of the two experts:
Using an adaptive rational mechanism Hommes, 1997, 1998 ], can be viewed as a frequency:
Similarly to Kaizoji (2003) and He and Westerhoff (2005) the switching mechanism is based on the accuracy of prediction. However their mechanism is built looking at differences between chartists and fundamentalist. Mainly in Kaizoji (2003) agents choose chartist strategy "according to the difference between the squared prediction errors of each strategy". While in He and Westerhoff (2005) the larger deviation of current price from fundamental values the greater is the quota of agents that follow a chartist's strategy.
In our case it is worth noting that the quota of agents that follow expert i depends on the relative distance between the corresponding fundamental value, and the current price. Moreover this mechanism is real clear-cut: when the fundamental value is equal to current price, in the next period all agents follow the corresponding expert. This implies that the quota varies from zero to one. 
which is a one dimensional nonlinear map. As in our model, it is inspired by Day and Huang (1990) ; and, as in He and Westerhoff (2005) and Dieci et al (2001) , the dynamic is triggered by a cubic one-dimensional map following the switching mechanism. 5 3 Homogeneous Fundamentalists: uniqueness, existence and stability Given that we want to show how simple heterogeneity can generate complex dynamics, it is worth starting our analysis exploring the case when there is complete homogeneity (
Proposition 1. When there is a unique fixed point: 
which is a linear map. A steady state condition is implied, particularly when and then (7) with different values of the market maker reaction coefficient, β . Figure 1a and 1b respectively show the case in which there is global stability with monotonic or oscillatory convergence.
3 Inequality in the reaction coefficients does not change the following analysis. Figure 1c we show the particular set of parameters that determines a period-two cycle and finally in Figure 1d how the divergence to infinity is reported.
Therefore the linearity guarantees a monotonically or oscillatory convergence for a particular set of parameters.
Specifically convergence is guaranteed both by market makers and by all agents who do not overreact to misalignment.
Otherwise, if one of the reaction coefficients is too high a divergence to infinity occurs. Furthermore, only if the map is perpendicular to the intersecting line, can there be two period cycles.
Heterogeneous Fundamentalists: Steady States and Local Analysis
Differently from what we have seen in the last paragraph, even a simple heterogeneity gives rise to new steady states and to a richer variety of dynamical behaviour. In this section we explore the existence of steady states and local stability by devoting it to the analysis of global dynamics.
Let
be the steady state of the map (6). Hence, it has to satisfy:
Applying straightforward algebra, the fundamental values of the two experts, and , are always steady states. In addition there is a third steady state represented, equal to:
( 1 0 ) which is exactly the arithmetic means of the fundamental values; * P is encompassed between the two fundamental values:
.
Finally, given equation (5) Proof. The derivative of the dynamic equation (6) 
Using straightforward algebra to evaluate the (11) in the fixed points we achieve: Since both β and α are positive the derivate (13) is more than 1: therefore, there is always instability.
The stability properties of these two steady states do not depend on the fundamental values themselves but rather on both reaction coefficients α and β . This result indicates that a limited feedback to misalignments and narrow market maker reaction can stabilize the fundamental value. Therefore turbulences in the market are generated by an overreaction to market misalignments and by an overreaction of market makers to excesses in demand (supply). (12) we already know that these parameters produce a period doubling bifurcation.
Economically, starting from an excess in demand ( 2 F P o < ), agent overreaction leads to a large price increase in such a way that the price becomes higher than . An excess in demand is transformed into an excess in supply. Even in this case, given a high 2 F α , agents that follow expert 2 supply a bulky quantity that leads the price down, particularly less than . Hence the system fluctuates between excess of demand and excess of supply at round . 
Conclusion and Further research
This paper covers price dynamics in financial markets. Unlike canonical models (based on heterogeneity), we focus on agents with the same trading rules (fundamentalists) where heterogeneity depends on different fundamental values and reaction coefficients to misalignments. In addition we employ a very simple switch mechanism.
We show that (i) market instability and periodic, or even, chaotic price fluctuations can be generated; (ii) conditions exist under which an expert can drive another expert out of the market; (iii) two experts can survive when the dynamic system either generates a period doubling bifurcation around an attractor or when an homoclinic bifurcation leads to the merging of the two attractors (i.e. Dieci et al., 2001) ; (iv) a central role is played by the reaction to misalignment of both market makers and agents.
Heterogeneity in financial markets has been developed in various models which have aided in explaining financial market dynamics. A further development of our model should aim at using a different algorithm, such as that of BrookHommes (1997) , which can always foresee the coexistence of both experts. Moreover, since our simple switch mechanism is based on the distance between current price and fundamental values, it would be interesting to analyze the dynamics generated by heterogeneity in the case of profitability based imitative process.
